I Believe Things (Terms and Conditions Apply)
Managing Opinion Editor Caroline Flinn ’28 examines their own struggle with asserting firm opinions, arguing that while there’s a fine line between explaining nuance and over-explaining, it’s important to acknowledge that searching for the perfect way to say something leads to saying nothing.
It should not be particularly surprising that I have opinions. I am, after all, a Managing Opinion Editor for The Student. I even have some opinions that I feel relatively confident about, depending on the subject, the available information, and whether someone has replied to me with a sufficiently intimidating paragraph through the comment feature of The Student’s website, Fizz, or on Planworld.
This has become something of a problem.
Over the past two years, I have written for The Student about queerness, political violence, local politics, civil rights, community engagement, lesbian bars, and, somewhat less consequentially, Taylor Swift. My articles have argued, among other things, that political violence is embedded in American political life; that queerness should resist assimilation; that students should care about the town even if they only temporarily inhabit it; that online progressive politics can devolve into moral performance; and that attacks on transgender rights should concern people who do not personally identify as transgender. Those sound like statements, but I promise that they were significantly less straightforward by the time I finished writing them. Because somewhere within my work with The Student, or maybe just within my time in college, I developed an almost pathological need to qualify everything I say.
I say “almost pathological” because I am not a psychologist, this article is not a diagnosis, and I do not mean to trivialize actual pathology. See what I mean?
The problem becomes especially obvious when I write about politics. There are things I believe quite strongly. I believe trans people deserve civil rights, that American political violence extends beyond the spectacular violence we are trained to recognize, that queer politics should involve something more substantial than having the correct opinions online, that institutions deserve scrutiny, and that solidarity requires materially supporting the people we claim to care about.
Apparently, I also believe that every sentence expressing one of those things must be accompanied by three smaller sentences explaining all of the things that I do not mean.
When I wrote “Political Violence is the American Tradition,” I argued that violence was not some aberration from an otherwise peaceful American democracy, but rather a recurring feature of American political life. Then, towards the end, I apparently became terrified that someone would read an entire article about the horror of political violence and conclude that I was personally endorsing murder, so I clarified: “Recognizing the history of American political violence was ‘not an act of cynicism, nor [was] it an endorsement.’” It was true, but also a qualifier. And, to qualify my criticism of that qualifier, probably a necessary one. This is going well.
The exact same thing happened when I wrote about “palatable queerness.” I wanted to argue that there was something politically troubling about sanding queerness down until it fit perfectly within a heteronormative society. But I did not want to imply that there is one correct way to be queer, because there obviously isn’t, or that queer people have some individual obligation to be permanently radical, which would be both exhausting and ridiculous. So after questioning whether queerness could ever become too palatable, I made sure to explain that I also resisted “framing queerness as a kind of purity test.” Queerness should challenge norms. Unless you don’t want to. There is no correct way to be queer. But I do think there are politically meaningful ways of thinking about queerness. But I’m not policing your identity. Unless you are President Donald Trump. Although Donald Trump is not, to my knowledge, asking me to validate his queer identity. Though he did come out as genderfluid. But otherwise, I think I am safe on that one. Probably.
I used to think this compulsive need to qualify things was simply good writing. After all, good arguments acknowledge complexity. They anticipate objections. They distinguish between similar but, importantly, different claims. If you write that political violence is foundational to the U.S., you probably should also explain that understanding violence is different from endorsing it. To be clear, I am not anti-nuance. But I am beginning to suspect that what I call “nuance” sometimes contains something else: fear. Not exactly the fear that I am wrong, but the fear of being read wrong. That is a strangely different anxiety.
Writing publicly about politics means surrendering control of your argument the second it leaves your Google Doc. You know what you meant, but when somebody else reads it, they bring their own assumptions, politics, frustrations, experiences, and definitions to it. Suddenly the sentence you thought meant A apparently means B, C, colonialism, neoliberalism, fascism, insufficient material analysis, and that you personally hate disabled people. To be clear, that last sentence is hyperbole.
And if you are politically left-wing, as I am, though I recognize the inadequacy of collapsing a large and internally contradictory political tradition into a single spatial metaphor, then you have an additional incentive to anticipate every possible misreading. So, you learn the vocabulary of the objection before anyone makes it.
What about class? Paragraph seven. What about disability? Paragraph nine. Does this reproduce heteronormativity? Footnote forthcoming. Are you suggesting that every person who disagrees with you is morally deficient? No, and actually, thank you for bringing that up. I have prepared 600 words on precisely that question. This is how an 800-word op-ed becomes 2,000 words.
Anyone familiar with “Confessions of a Chronically Over-Word-Count Editor” may reasonably point out that brevity was never exactly my defining characteristic. In that article, I acknowledged that staying under 2,000 words induced something resembling heart palpitations and described myself as perhaps “philosophically opposed” to conciseness. I would now like to propose my defense: Approximately 40% of those words are disclaimers, though this percentage is not empirically verified.
As alluded to previously, the qualifications get most intense when I am writing about communities or movements that I actually care about. That is probably not accidental. When I criticize conservatism, I am not particularly worried that someone will mistake my criticism for secret affection for conservatism. When I criticize queer politics, the left, Amherst, activism, or progressive spaces, I suddenly feel compelled to produce my ideological passport.
This became especially obvious in “I Survived the Great Lesbian Bar Discourse of 2026.” We criticized a particular version of online progressive politics that seemed more interested in identifying villains than sustaining community. But the article repeatedly clarified what that criticism didn’t mean: accessibility concerns were real; immunocompromised queer people deserved safe spaces; criticizing certain responses did not mean abandoning disability justice or queer solidarity. I still think those distinctions were necessary. But I also think it is worth asking why they felt so necessary. There is a peculiar pressure in contemporary political discourse to establish, before criticizing something, that you are criticizing it correctly.
When you write on issues, you must first establish that you understand them. Then, you must establish your politics. Then clarify the politics motivating the criticism. Then denounce the bad-faith version of your argument. Then acknowledge the people who might be harmed by a bad-faith interpretation of the criticism. Then acknowledge that your personal experience is not universal. Then, assuming there are still words remaining, make the point. This can be responsible. It can also become suffocating.
I do want to be careful. Sloppy generalizations about marginalized communities cause real harm. Context and positionality do matter. There are absolutely people who weaponize “I’m just asking questions” or “you’re too sensitive” as excuses for prejudice. I am not arguing for some glorious return to an imaginary era when everyone said whatever they wanted and nobody complained. I am aware that the fact that I felt compelled to write the preceding paragraph is the entire point of this article.
But qualifiers become dangerous when they stop making an argument more precise and start making the writer less vulnerable.“I think.” “In some ways.” “Perhaps.” “Of course.” “That is not to say.” “I don’t mean to suggest.” “To be clear.” “Obviously.” “Importantly.” “At the same time.” “The situation is more complicated than that.” I love these phrases. They are my beautiful little emergency exits.
Because making an unqualified political statement means accepting the terrifying possibility that somebody might understand exactly what you are saying and still disagree with you. There is something strangely comforting about being misunderstood. If someone objects to a qualified version of my argument, I can always retreat to the qualification. “That isn’t quite what I said.” “You’re leaving out the part where I acknowledged that.” But if I say exactly what I believe, without building 17 emergency exits into the sentence, then the disagreement is harder to explain away. Maybe they understood me perfectly. Maybe they just think I am wrong. There is nowhere to hide.
And maybe that is what I have been trying to avoid. Not being wrong but being legibly wrong. Having an opinion clear enough that another person can point to it and say “no.” There is a political dimension to that fear too. If every position must survive every conceivable objection before we are permitted to express it, politics becomes remarkably good at producing people who are excellent at identifying complications and terrified of making demands.
You can get very good at noticing what is missing from an argument without ever having to say what you would put in its place. You can point out what the demand fails to account for, the assumptions hidden inside it, the ways its language might exclude someone, the historical problems it accidentally reproduces. And sometimes those criticisms are exactly right. Sometimes they make the demand better.
But there is also a point at which finding a problem in every political position becomes a position itself: one where nothing is ever quite careful enough to be said, much less demanded. The result is a politics that can become much better at critique rather than commitment to the argument. We know how to say why something is more complicated than it appears and we are certainly less than comfortable saying what should actually happen next, because political demands are almost always going to be incomplete. They are made by people, people who cannot anticipate every conceivable consequence. If we wait until a demand is impossible to criticize before making it, we are going to be waiting forever.
We can explain every side. We can locate ourselves within every contradiction. We can acknowledge every caveat. We can write a truly incredible parenthetical. Eventually, though, politics requires somebody to say: I think this is wrong. This does not mean saying something is universally wrong under every conceivable philosophical framework throughout all of human history. It also doesn’t mean wrong subject to seventeen qualifications and a bibliography. Just wrong.
I am trying to become better at saying that, but I do not mean that I want to become more careless. I don't want to stop questioning myself, anticipating objections, or changing my mind when somebody points out something I missed. If anything, I hope I keep doing all of those things. But I would like to stop confusing intellectual humility with intellectual paralysis. I would like to trust that a sentence does not have to account for every possible interpretation before it deserves to exist. I would like to believe that being precise means saying exactly what I mean, not preemptively explaining everything I could not possibly mean.
I would like to write a sentence and resist the urge to immediately rescue myself from it. So here goes: I believe things. Some of them strongly. Some of them, inevitably, are wrong. And I can live with that. I think.
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